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Primer: The Economy of Jammu and Kashmir
The economy of Jammu and Kashmir before the 
beginning of the insurgency that beset it in 1990 
had been primarily an agricultural economy. There 
was very little industry (although Kashmiri handi-
crafts created a niche for themselves) and the service 
sector was dominated primarily by tourism. These 
sectors of the economy, which brought in cash to 
the state, depended heavily on customs from the rest 
of India. Apples from the valley of Kashmir found 
their markets elsewhere in India, while tourists from 
different parts of India buoyed local tourism and 
handicrafts. Indeed, given its low population the 
narrowness of Jammu and Kashmir’s domestic market 
could not be expected to support rapid growth of 
the state’s economy. Thus integration with the wider 
national market was of vital importance to the state’s 
economy.   
The manner of this integration was not merely 
a unification of markets but also free transit for 
the citizens from the rest of India. This, it may be 
noted, had been achieved only in 1953—five years 
after the state’s accession—following an agitation 
led by Shyama Prosad Mookherjee, founder of the 
Bharatiya Jana Sangh (Indian People’s Union), against 
the identification card rule that was seen to be a 
hindrance to the free entry and exit of people from 
other parts of India. Jammu and Kashmir’s economy 
was therefore tied to the national economy of the 
country. Given the fact that the Indian economy 
did not quite take off in the first three decades after 
independence, neither did that of the state. It may 
be noted that the strengths and weaknesses of the 
state’s economy reflected its terrain. Except for some 
areas in Jammu and the valley, the state is mountain-
ous, ensuring that transport costs would be high. 
Consequently, the state could have a cost advantage 
only with those products where it had a monopoly 
or high value-low volume items where high transport 
costs could be neutralized. The state was and remains 
the highest producer of apples in India, as well as 
a host of dry fruits and traditional handicrafts that 
fitted this criterion. But the state then and even now 
added very little value to raw fruit that it produced, 
thus missing an opportunity to supplement its poor 
creation of gainful employment. Such a step required 
an economic regime that would allow entrepreneurs 
to take advantage of opportunities and set up plants 
and factories as freely as possible. however, India’s 
economic regime prior to 1991 was governed by a 
system of permits and licenses and did not allow for 
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such autonomous efforts on the part of independent 
private agents. Therefore, in spite of tremendous 
potential in terms of raw material available, agro-
industries never took off. Thus, three decades after 
accession, the sectoral composition of the economy 
of Jammu and Kashmir was as described in Figure 1, 
below.
There was marginal change in the decade that fol-
lowed and the overall composition of the Jammu and 
Kashmir economy remained the same.
The onset of insurgency was a major blow to those 
sectors of the economy that were linked to the money 
economy. however, different sectors of the economy 
coped in different ways with the result that the trajec-
tory of evolution of each sector differed dramatically. 
Some sectors were obviously very badly affected. 
Others were forced by circumstances to take steps, as 
a result of which they did amazingly well without any 
government effort. A study of these various sectors 
in a milieu of economic uncertainty and government 
policies in those settings is extremely important for 
a better comprehension of how agents react under 
these circumstances. The lessons learnt from such a 
study have policy implications and are directly linked 
to the possibilities of a peace dividend. 
Sectors Badly Affected: Tourism
The insurgency completely crippled the tourism 
industry in the Kashmir valley. Tourist arrivals that 
had numbered over 700,000 in 1988 and over a 
half-million in 1989 fell to little over ten thousand 
in 1990. Kashmir valley tourism was not to witness 
a return to six figures until 1998, when it barely 
crossed a hundred thousand. It doubled the follow-
ing year but fell off after the Kargil conflict with 
Pakistan that year. The valley remains attractive to 
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tourists even with the threat of terror. Indeed, tourists 
have to be specially targeted by terrorists to dissuade 
them from visiting the valley. The possibility that 
this dissuasion is planned is heightened given that 
the tourist groups chosen for attack (usually grenade 
attacks) have been from West Bengal and Gujarat 
where Kashmir has been a favorite destination. This is 
not to say that the entire state witnessed a decline in 
tourist arrivals. The other regions of the state, Jammu 
and Ladakh, were less affected. In fact, outstation 
tourist arrivals in Jammu rose from two million to 
over four million in the 1990s. Ladakh was of course 
more affected, but numbers never fell precipitously as 
in Kashmir. Jammu’s tourism was pilgrimage tourism 
mainly centered on the Shri Mata Vaishno Devi 
Shrine. But in contrast to Kashmir, the bulk of arriv-
als in Jammu came from a lower economic stratum 
and the amounts that they spent reflected this charac-
teristic. Thus, even as the number of pilgrims to the 
shrine crossed six million in 2006, tourism generated 
only Rs 450 crores (approximately $110 million) for 
the region, a modest sum given the absolute numbers 
involved. 
The Potential Peace Dividend
Tourism as an industry naturally relies on peace 
and stability for sustenance. Tourist arrivals in the 
various regions of the state reflect this, in the sense 
that numbers in each division depend on local law 
and order conditions as well as proximity to conflict 
zones. This is why Ladakh suffers. The peace dividend 
for this sector therefore could be enormous. For one 
the synergies that complementarities between Jammu 
and Kashmir provide could lead to a massive boost 
in tourism in both places but more significantly to 
the valley. Religious pilgrims to the Mata Vaishno 
Devi Shrine or the Shrine of Baba Ghulam Shah 
Badshah at Rajouri (also in Jammu Division) could 
easily travel a bit further—via a new rail link that 
now will connect the Valley to the rest of the country 
for the Vaishno Devi pilgrims, and via the Mughal 
Road for the pilgrimage tourists in Rajouri. Thus 
the Valley would gain by mere proximity to Jammu. 
But more importantly, India’s burgeoning middle 
class—a product of India’s economic liberalization 
policies and a class that is no longer afraid to spend, 
and which seeks to travel to neighboring himachal 
Pradesh to cool off during summer, swelling tourist 
arrivals there to over 5 million—would also look to 
the Valley to cool off. It is well known that Jammu 
and Kashmir has all the geographical features of 
himachal and more to attract tourists of all hues, 
from adventure tourists, to eco-tourists, to religious 
tourists, to those who merely want to “get away.” 
What it does not have is safety and security. This is 
partially true also of those areas of Jammu that would 
compete with the Valley for the same kind of tourists. 
Secondly, these parts of Jammu that border himachal 
Pradesh also lack the necessary infrastructure, with 
existing infrastructure having been severely degraded 
in the 1990s due to neglect forced by the insurgency.
Infrastructure
The 1990s witnessed a sharp decline in infrastruc-
ture availability in the state. Some of this was due to 
sabotage by militants targeting social and physical 
infrastructure. Neglect played its part also, especially 
when it came to assets like roads in hilly terrain with 
considerable precipitation. 
Figure 2 above reflects the impacts of the infra-
structural damage. While transport infrastructure 
damage—that is, vehicles damaged—could be very 
easily replaced, this is not true for roads and bridges. 
Given the fact that the money economy of the state 
is particularly dependent on connectivity with the 
rest of India for its survival, the damage to sectors 
like horticulture was immense. Before the targeting 
of infrastructure, horticulture exports to other states 
had not been affected by militancy. But the years fol-
lowing1993-94 witnessed a precipitous trend, from 
which this sector would recover only in 2000.
This again is not unusual. horticulture is a local 
activity carried out largely with the help of local 
people. horticultural production per se does not 
depend on law and order in the sense that tourism 
does, as local people are not targets of attack by mili-
tants. But when infrastructure is targeted (as shown 
in the figure), the outcome cannot be in doubt. 
however, with the security forces gaining ascendancy 
over the militants in the valley, widespread target-
ing of infrastructure is no longer that easy. More 
importantly, it draws local ire, alienating the very 
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people whose support militants must have to operate 
successfully.
Government Policy and the Creation 
of a Terrorist Economy
The state’s response to an economy damaged by mili-
tancy developed along predicted lines. As in North 
East India, the central government came in with 
packages aimed at reviving the economy through 
grants intended to restore infrastructure as well as 
other parts of the economy. The effect of all this was 
to create an economy whose State Domestic Product 
(SDP) sectoral break-down, as given by Table 1 and 
Figure 3, defied common economic logic. The ulti-
mate twist to this bizarre economic history was the 
revelation by the National Sample Survey Organisa-
tion that Jammu and Kashmir ranked highest of all 
the states when it came to per household asset owner-
ship in the country, with Rs 10.87 lakhs (approxi-
mately $27,650) per household.  
The profile of economic activities, with its accent 
on construction and public administration and sub-
stantial contributions from banking and real estate, 
would be puzzling to most economies. The revela-
tion about asset ownership only compounded the 
puzzle. There is of course little doubt that the massive 
increase in the number of security forces sent to this 
troubled state and the expenditures made locally to 
maintain this force would have an expansionary effect 
on the local economy.
But it also now increasingly clear that as in the 
North East, the economic packages announced by 
the central government would follow a particular 
trajectory that would deliver similar results. As “pack-
ages” and “projects” were announced, the preferred 
vehicles of delivery were contractors who or at least 
whose political patrons reposed their faith in the 
Indian Constitution. The mode of awarding contracts 
remained opaque. Such businessmen soon attracted 
the attention of the militants and became easy targets 
for extortion. It may be argued that there was social 
sanction for this treatment not the least because the 
manner in which these contracts were secured were 
not seen to be above board. The relations built up 
by the businessmen and the extorting militants had 
some serious consequences. As long as the money 
was paid, the business operations of the businessmen 
would not be targeted. This of course assumed that 
the militant who received these sums was capable 
of maintaining sufficient discipline in his cadre to 
prevent others from targeting businessmen who paid 
up. however, should such a person be killed by the 
security forces, it meant that fresh arrangements 
would have to be made between the businessmen and 
the militants who succeeded their slain comrades. 
Indeed, the killings of migrant laborers in June 2006 
happened just after the security forces killed a top 
militant. The killing of the laborers was not an act 
of retribution but a signal that a new set of militants 
had arrived and new “arrangements” would have 
to be made. In short, while the state had in place a 
system of “development” practices aimed at buying 
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Table 1 • Composition of J&K SDP: 2001–2002
Sector Magnitude (Rs crore) (% share)
Agriculture 3902.75 27.64
Forestry and logging 493.84 3.50
Fishing 102.52 0.72
Mining & Quarrying 14.67 0.10
Subtotal: Primary 4513.79 31.96
Manufacturing (reg.) 175.82 1.25
Manufacturing (Unreg.) 550.35 3.90
Construction 2087.66 14.72
Electricity, Gas & Water –478.66 –3.39
Subtotal: Secondary 2326.48 16.47
Transport, Comm. and Trade 720.04 5.10
Trade, Hotel and Rest. 1424.53 10.09
Banking and Insurance 627.42 4.44
Real Estate 773.09 5.47
Public Administration 2184.30 15.47
Other Services 1551.94 10.99
Subtotal: Tertiary 7281.32 51.56
NSDP 14121.59 100
Population 102.83
Per Capita 13733
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the “hearts and minds” of the people, what it ended 
up doing was to make militants richer while at the 
same time entrenching the institution of corruption 
deeper and deeper into the culture of the state. It 
is no wonder then that Transparency International 
India finally ranked the state as “most corrupt,” 
relieving Bihar of this dubious honor.
It is this system of transfers that led to the state 
being a massive consumer of white goods, automo-
biles as well as a source of financial investment, a 
totally unexpected state of affairs for a region bogged 
down in a quagmire of violence for over a decade. 
The poverty ratio for the state had plunged to a very 
low and enviable 3.5%, compared to the national 
average of 26.1%. Of course, military expenditures in 
the state cannot entirely account for this dramatic fall 
in poverty. It must be remembered that unlike most 
parts of India, land holdings were fairly equitable as a 
result of successful land reforms carried out by Sheikh 
Mohammad Abdullah’s government during his first 
stint as Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir. Thus, 
asset inequality in terms of land holdings had long 
been addressed with its obvious impact on poverty. 
But the fall in poverty rates especially at a time of 
sustained militancy only pointed to open and sur-
reptitious transfers, which while mitigating poverty 
entrenched the already existing system of corruption 
even deeper.
Handicrafts
The sector that did remarkably well during this 
period was the handicrafts sector. Employment in 
this industry increased throughout the 1990s from 
225,000 workers directly employed to 320,000 in 
2001. Since this industry is in private hands, it may 
be assumed that this represented gainful employment. 
The growth occurred at the same time when the total 
number of training centers declined from 635 (1994) 
to 535 (2000). While the total number of coopera-
tives set up to help artisans market their wares almost 
doubled in the 1990s, their combined sales almost 
halved. On the other hand, the state-owned Jammu 
and Kashmir handicrafts Corporation did a far more 
impressive job by upgrading its Management Infor-
mation Systems and ensuring that its total turnover 
increased from Rs 5600 million ($142 million) in 
1994-5 to Rs 8690 million ($220 million) in 2000-1. 
The total expected turnover (domestic sales plus 
exports) in 2007 is in the range of Rs 15,000 million 
($381 million), but there are observers who claim 
that this is a conservative estimate and that the actual 
figure is at least twice this number.
What is noteworthy is that the bulk of this 
trade takes place beyond the aegis of the state and 
through private hands un-aided by the state. This 
again is ironically due to the militancy that swayed 
the state in the 1990s. Itinerant Kashmiri handicraft 
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merchants forced into hawking their wares house-to-
house in many Indian cities became a common sight. 
This strategy was necessitated by the fact that a major 
source of demand—tourists—had stopped visiting 
the valley. Soon Kashmiri handicraft dealers had 
hit upon the novel idea of setting up shop in those 
parts of India where visitors thronged, such as Goa, 
Delhi, and Kerala. Thus, Kashmiri handicrafts facing 
the vicissitudes of militancy adopted such measures 
and tactics whereby they were able to overcome the 
limitations of the market defined by tourist arrivals in 
the Valley and integrate themselves with the national 
and global economy. This sector did so without much 
help from the state and in extremely difficult condi-
tions. They were able to do so because handicrafts 
remain a business where much of the production 
takes place indoors. Curfews do not affect produc-
tion and demands on infrastructure are few. Thus 
production is not affected by militancy. The nature of 
its markets does not call for a “just-in-time” system, 
and as such small disruptions in supply are easily 
absorbed.   
This is in marked contrast to sectors such as small 
and medium scale enterprises, which have not been 
able to wean themselves from generous subsidies to 
compete and integrate with the national market. 
Thus, the state of Jammu and Kashmir represents a 
paradox where sectors that are relatively unaided have 
managed to carve a niche for themselves in the global 
economy, while sectors that are the recipient of state 
largesse have not been able to do so.
Policy Implications 
What policy implications may one derive from India’s 
Kashmir experience viewed through the prism of eco-
nomics? It is clear that the central government’s effort 
to bribe the state into submission has not worked. It 
is also clear from the success stories in the handicraft 
sector that such an approach is not warranted. What 
is needed is a participatory approach to economic 
policy and development. 
The destruction in rural infrastructure, which 
needs to be repaired, should see the involvement 
of village councils (called Halqa Panchayat in the 
state). The centralized manner in which these tasks 
are planned in the state currently involve the District 
Collector, the Members of Legislative Assembly who 
belong to that district, and the Member of Parliament 
under whose constituency that district falls. Popular 
involvement in planning and execution is totally 
absent. While the 73rd and 74th Amendments to the 
Indian Constitution have given constitutional status 
and some financial teeth to the local bodies in the 
rest of India, this is not true in Jammu and Kashmir 
which vide Article 370 has its own constitution. The 
state’s local level bodies are disempowered and elec-
tions are irregular. Thus an important instrument of 
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local empowerment, policy planning, and implemen-
tation is absent. It is doubtful that these bodies will 
be targeted by militants for extortion, as that would 
alienate the very people whose support or at least 
silence is necessary for militancy to thrive. The lack 
of use of local popular bodies to create rural infra-
structure instead of private contractors chosen in a 
centralized manner through dubious means does little 
to reduce popular alienation or re-create infrastruc-
ture. What it leads to is a skewed income and asset 
distribution apart from enriching the militants. Simi-
larly, steps taken in the direction of entrepreneurship 
training among local residents so as to enable them 
to set up enterprises on their own is a more sustain-
able model than setting up state-owned enterprises. 
These activities, especially in the areas of adding value 
to horticultural produce, can do much to generate 
incomes and employment. Making them targets of 
extortion by militants may not be accompanied by 
the same social sanction as in the case of extortion of 
government contractors. 
So far, neither the state government nor the 
central government has moved in this direction, 
although most recently the central government has 
prodded the state government in the direction of 
democratic decentralization. This clearly is an oppor-
tunity lost, as the goal of economic development 
need not be given up even when an insurgency is on. 
But in a milieu where years of “easy money” accentu-
ated by “security concerns” create an impressive 
array of vested interests bolstered by casualty graphs 
that point downwards accompanied by surprisingly 
steady numbers of militants waiting to infiltrate into 
India, resources keep on flowing in the same manner 
and volume as previously. In such circumstances, 
policy shifts—especially radical ones—are the first 
casualties. 
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Water, Wars, and Kashmir
Conflicts over water—a precious resource, the 
supply of which is growing sparser and the demand 
for which is ever mounting—have been much talked 
about by experts. Growing populations and extending 
development would render conflicts between water-
rich and water-scarce nations inevitable. Upstream 
states that control the flow of water to downstream 
states would use this valuable resource as a key dip-
lomatic and strategic tool to coerce the downstream 
nations into submitting to its demands. According to 
the 2002 United Nations World Water Development 
Report, there were 507 conflictive events over water 
during the previous fifty years. Thirty-seven among 
these involved violence, of which 21 consisted of 
military acts (18 between Israel and its neighbors). 
“Some of the most vociferous enemies around the 
world have negotiated water agreements [concerning 
international rivers] or are in the process of doing 
so,” says the report. Global warming would act as a 
catalyst to water-conflict scenarios, with decreasing 
rainfall and increasing evaporation in some areas 
that have made the regular climate patterns erratic. 
Intermittent phases of flooding and droughts causing 
massive human suffering would pressure governments 
into turning off the taps to its neighbors.
The Indus River, whose basin cradled one of the 
oldest civilizations of the world, sustains Pakistan 
today. Both India and Pakistan depend on snow-fed 
rivers that rise in the himalayas. Pakistan depends on 
the Indus for its survival and sustenance. The Indus, 
moreover, passes through Jammu and Kashmir, which 
is in dispute between the two countries. The history 
of water sharing between India and Pakistan has been 
marked by exceptional cooperation and intermittent 
conflicts over the interpretation of the water sharing 
treaty that forms the basis for this cooperation. The 
Tulbul Navigation Project and the Baglihar, Kishan-
ganga, and Salal hydroelectric power projects are a 
few contentious issues between the two countries 
revolving around the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT). The 
incongruities in interpretations of the IWT have been 
attributed to political motives, rather than differ-
ences over technical and engineering aspects of water 
management.
The Indus Waters Treaty: Emergence of an 
Effective Conflict Management Tool 
The IWT brokered by the World Bank (WB) 
provided for the division of the rivers between 
India and Pakistan. The eastern rivers—Sutlej, Beas 
Kashmir and Water: Conflict and 
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